Competing with asking prices
研究了卖家使用要价（asking price）定价机制的市场，证明在简单现实条件下，要价能同时最大化卖家收益并实现有效均衡，并刻画了该均衡对交易价格和分配的影响。
In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller receives no better offers. We construct an environment with a few simple, realistic ingredients and demonstrate that, by using an asking price, sellers both maximize their revenue and implement the efficient outcome in equilibrium. We provide a complete characterization of this equilibrium and use it to explore the implications of this pricing mechanism for transaction prices and allocations.