Institutional complementarities, intellectual property rights and technology in the knowledge economy
研究了企业内部强知识产权与弱知识产权的权衡，发现弱知识产权能吸引熟练工人但离职后企业失去产权，强知识产权则相反，并指出知识经济中技能和知识含量增加并非必然。
Abstract This essay explores the trade-off between strong and weak intellectual property rights inside firms with reference to the importance of job termination. The probability of job termination has an effect on the relative profitability of different intellectual property rights regimes. Weak intellectual property rights may make it more attractive for skilled workers to join the firm, which will increase its profits while employing workers. However, when a job match is terminated the firm is left with the ownership of intellectual property only under a strong intellectual property rights regime. Based on the institutional complementarities approach we develop a simple model that analyses this trade-off, in which multiple organisational equilibria exist. We show that when intellectual property rights are taken into account, expectations such as increase in the skill and knowledge content of work are not inevitable in the knowledge economy.