Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences
本文提出“一致单调性”条件，证明它是理性可实施对应关系的必要且几乎充分条件，该条件比Maskin单调性弱得多，从而扩大了可通过沟通型经济制度分散化的规则类别。
A new condition, which we call uniform monotonicity, is shown to be necessary and almost sufficient for rationalizable implementation of correspondences. Uniform monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity and reduces to it in the case of functions. Maskin monotonicity, the key condition for Nash implementation, had also been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Our conclusion is that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are not only starkly different from but also, much weaker than those for Nash implementation when we consider social choice correspondences. Thus, dropping rational expectations significantly expands the class of rules that can be decentralized by communication-based economic institutions.