代理成本、市场纪律与市场时机:来自IPO后经营业绩的证据

Agency Costs, Market Discipline and Market Timing: Evidence from Post-IPO Operating Performance

ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE · 1996
被引 23
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

比较了1985年99家IPO公司与匹配的成熟公司,发现IPO公司效率更高但市净率下降,代理成本未增加,市场纪律促使企业家维持业绩,股价下跌源于投资者过度支付。

Abstract

We compare ninety-nine 1985 IPO firms with a matched sample of “seasoned” firms. The IPO firms were more efficient and profitable, yet exhibited declining market-to-book-equity ratios over the 1985-1992 period. However, we observe no significant trend toward lower efficiency or profitability among the IPO firms. In fact, we observe a significant improvement in operating efficiency five to six years after the IPO. Post-IPO evidence suggests that (1) agency costs do not Increase; (2) the markets discipline entrepreneurs with incentives to maintain pre-IPO performance; and (3) poor stock performance is due to investors who overpay, extrapolating current performance into the future.

首次公开发行公司治理代理成本市场时机经营业绩