It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans
研究了401(k)计划中作为服务提供商的共同基金家族是否偏爱自家关联基金，发现关联基金的删除和添加对过往业绩的敏感度更低，且参与者未通过投资选择消除这种偏见，但偏见并非基于信息优势。
ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether mutual fund families acting as service providers in 401(k) plans display favoritism toward their own affiliated funds. Using a hand‐collected data set on the menu of investment options offered to plan participants, we show that fund deletions and additions are less sensitive to prior performance for affiliated than unaffiliated funds. We find no evidence that plan participants undo this affiliation bias through their investment choices. Finally, we find that the subsequent performance of poorly performing affiliated funds indicates that this favoritism is not information driven.