Board Composition and Relationship‐Specific Investments by Customers and Suppliers
研究发现，当供应商或客户对关系专用资产投入更多时，企业更可能将其纳入董事会；这种安排有助于减少信息风险和强化非正式合同，从而缓解投资不足问题。
Firms are more likely to include a supplier‐customer on the board if the supplier‐customer invests more in relationship‐specific assets. The results are stronger when the firm has poorer financial reporting quality or is financially distressed, as well as post‐SOX. Suppliers‐customers also increase their relationship‐specific investment following their appointment to the board. Directorships help avoid underinvestment and mitigate contracting frictions by reducing information risks and strengthening informal contracts with the firm.