Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties
提出一种主权借贷理论，假设违约惩罚不可实施，并证明当国内外投资者均持有债务时，中位选民可能有动机偿还债务。该理论对金融中介作用、资本流动与价格波动、以及债权人高度分散时的债务重组有重要启示。
We develop a theory of sovereign borrowing where default penalties are not implementable. We show that when debt is held by both domestic and foreign agents, the median voter might have an interest in serving it. Our theory has important practical implications regarding (a) the role of financial intermediaries in sovereign lending, (b) the effect of capital flows on price volatility including the possible overvaluation of debt to the point that the median voter is priced out of the market, and (c) debt restructuring where creditors are highly dispersed.