Endogenous debt maturity and rollover risk
实证研究银行如何管理展期风险，发现债务展期本身不增加违约风险，只有同时失去新融资渠道的银行才面临更高风险，而市场悲观情绪同时驱动债务期限缩短和融资渠道减少。
Abstract We empirically study the nature of rollover risk and show how banks manage it. Having to roll over debt does not lead to higher default risk per se. Only banks that lose significant access to new funding while having to roll over debt display higher default risk. We identify a factor that determines this buildup of risk: specifically, debt maturity shortening (forcing debt to be more frequently rolled over) and reduced access to new funding are both driven by market pessimism about banks’ future performance. We also provide evidence consistent with dynamic coordination risk.