Property Taxation, Zoning, and Efficiency in a Dynamic Tiebout Model
构建了一个动态蒂布模型，重新审视汉密尔顿（1975）关于财产税与分区能实现住房与服务有效配置的经典论点，发现不存在既有效又局部稳定的均衡，且存在过度分区与过度消费住房的均衡，挑战了财产税的“受益观”。
This paper presents a dynamic Tiebout model and uses it to revisit a classic argument in public finance. The argument, due to Hamilton (1975), is that a system of governments financing services with property taxes will produce an efficient allocation of housing and services if governments can implement zoning ordinances. In the model, when governments choose zoning along with taxes and services, there does not exist an equilibrium that is both efficient and locally stable. Moreover, there exists an equilibrium in which governments over-zone and households overconsume housing. These findings challenge the Benefit View of the property tax.