Governing local supplier opportunism in China: Moderating role of institutional forces
研究基于制度理论，分析合同和信任在限制中国本地供应商机会主义中的作用，发现监管不确定性和关系结构（国内vs国际）会调节其效果。
Abstract China provides a vast and prominent manufacturing base, so curtailing its local supplier opportunism represents a primary concern for local and foreign buyers. Drawing on institutional theory, this study examines how regulatory uncertainty and relationship structure moderate the role of contracts and trust in restricting local supplier opportunism in China. An analysis of 293 buyer–supplier dyads in China reveals that contracts are more effective in deterring supplier opportunism when regulatory uncertainty is high. In addition, contracts help curtail opportunism more in domestic, compared with international, buyer–supplier relationships, whereas trust is more effective in restricting supplier opportunism in international relationships than in domestic ones.