Anti-corruption policy making, discretionary power and institutional quality: An experimental analysis
通过实验分析不同制度质量下政策制定者反腐败的激励，发现即使不腐败的官员也会因法律平等而降低检测概率，且选择检测的权力本身可能具有腐败性。
We analyse policymakers’ incentives to fight corruption under different institutional qualities. We find that ‘public officials’, even when non-corrupt, significantly distort anti-corruption institutions by choosing a lower detection probability when this probability applies to their own actions (legal equality), compared to a setting where it does not (legal inequality). More surprising perhaps is the finding that policy-makers do not choose a zero level of detection on average, even when it applies to them too. Finally, corruption is significantly lower when the detection probability is exogenously set, suggesting that the institutional power to choose detection can itself be corruptive.