The Effect of Regulations on Pension Risk Shifting: Evidence from the US and Europe
研究了养老金监管如何影响企业投资风险转移行为，发现美国固定保费制度下财务困境企业会转移风险，而英国风险调整保费和荷兰强制全额资金制度则抑制了这种行为。
Abstract This paper provides evidence that pension regulations can incentivize or curb risk shifting in the investment of defined benefit plan assets. We document that in the US, where the pension insurance premium charged by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation is largely flat, financially distressed firms with severely underfunded plans shift pension investment risk. We further find that risk shifting is mitigated in the UK after the implementation of risk‐adjusted pension insurance premiums, and in the Netherlands where full pension funding is mandatory. Overall the results in this paper lend support to the view that structural flaws in the US statutory pension insurance scheme incentivize high‐risk sponsors to gamble their pension assets when distress terminations of their plans become foreseeable.