Dynamic Delegation of Experimentation
研究委托人将实验任务动态委托给代理人的最优机制，发现最优规则是在信念空间中设置一个截止点：悲观类型获得完全自由，而乐观类型的行为受到限制。
I study a dynamic relationship where a principal delegates experimentation to an agent. Experimentation is modeled as a one-armed bandit that yields successes following a Poisson process. Its unknown intensity is high or low. The agent has private information, his type being his prior belief that the intensity is high. The agent values successes more than the principal does, so prefers more experimentation. The optimal mechanism is a cutoff rule in the belief space: the cutoff gives pessimistic types total freedom but curtails optimistic types’ behavior. Pessimistic types overexperiment while the most optimistic ones underexperiment. This delegation rule is time consistent.