Performance Measures in Earnings‐Based Financial Covenants in Debt Contracts
研究了贷款合同中基于收益的财务契约如何定义业绩衡量指标，发现常用EBITDA，但EBITDA解释信用风险的能力不如EBIT和净利润，选择EBITDA可能是为了降低对投资活动的敏感性。
ABSTRACT This paper examines how performance measures are defined in major earnings‐based financial covenants in loan contracts to shed light on the economic rationales underlying the contractual use of performance measures. I find an earnings‐based covenant is typically based on a performance measure close to earnings before interest, tax, amortization, and depreciation expenses (EBITDA). However, my empirical analyses show that EBITDA is less useful in explaining credit risk than earnings before interest and tax expenses (EBIT) and even the bottom‐line net income. Thus, measuring credit risk cannot fully explain the choice of accounting performance measures in earnings‐based covenants. I conjecture that contracting parties choose an EBITDA‐related measure, instead of a measure calculated after depreciation and amortization expenses (e.g., EBIT), to make the performance measure less sensitive to investment activities, which can be controlled through other contractual terms, such as a restriction on capital expenditure, and provide empirical evidence consistent with this conjecture.