On Enhancing Shareholder Control: A (Dodd‐) Frank Assessment of Proxy Access
利用2010年美国证券交易委员会通过的代理投票准入规则相关事件作为自然实验，研究股东控制权变化对企业估值的影响，发现控制权增强通常提升估值，但效果受公司业绩、股东动机等因素影响。
ABSTRACT We use events related to a proxy access rule passed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2010 as natural experiments to study the valuation effects of changes in shareholder control. We find that valuations increase (decrease) following increases (decreases) in perceived control, especially for firms that are poorly performing, have shareholders likely to exercise control, and where acquiring a stake is relatively inexpensive. These results suggest that an increase in shareholder control from its current level would generally benefit shareholders. However, we find that the benefits of increased control are muted for firms with shareholders whose interests may deviate from value maximization.