Torture and the Commitment Problem
研究酷刑作为从嫌疑人处获取信息的手段，发现其存在两个承诺问题：对无辜者施刑的承诺和对有罪者限制刑量的承诺，这些问题会大幅降低酷刑的有效性。
We study torture as a mechanism for extracting information from a suspect who may or may not be informed. We show that a standard rationale for torture generates two commitment problems. First, the principal would benefit from a commitment to torture a suspect he knows to be innocent. Secondly, the principal would benefit from a commitment to limit the amount of torture faced by the guilty. We analyse a dynamic model of torture in which the credibility of these threats and promises is endogenous. We show that these commitment problems dramatically reduce the value of torture and can even render it completely ineffective. We use our model to address questions such as the effect of enhanced interrogation techniques, rights against indefinite detention, and delegation of torture to specialists.