CEO Dismissal in Venture Capital-Backed Firms: Further Evidence from an Agency Perspective
运用代理理论研究风险投资支持企业中的CEO解雇原因，发现能力不足是主因，机会主义行为排最后，且因机会主义被解雇的CEO持股更多。
This study uses agency theory to examine CEO dismissal in venture capital-backed firms. Prior applications of agency theory have focused on reducing managerial opportunism by aligning the interests of manager with owner. Unlike large, mature firms, venture capital-backed companies feature high levels of CEO stock ownership. In this environment, we find that the primary reason for CEO dismissal is lack of agent ability, followed by good faith disagreements between principal and agent, with managerial opportunism ranking last. Further, we find that CEOs dismissed for opportunism owned more stock than those dismissed for other reasons.