募捐中介抑制基于质量的慈善捐赠

FUNDRAISING INTERMEDIARIES INHIBIT QUALITY‐DRIVEN CHARITABLE DONATIONS

Economic Inquiry · 2016
被引 16
ABS 3

中文导读

研究发现,通过中介募捐会让捐赠者忽略慈善机构的质量差异,导致低质量机构也能获得与高质量机构相同的捐赠,原因是信息过载。

Abstract

Charitable donations are frequently raised by an intermediary, which accepts donations and subsequently sends the proceeds to the chairty—for example, a workplace campaign for United Way, a 5‐km walk for Susan G. Komen, or buying cookies from a local troop for the Girl Scouts. These fundraisers can greatly increase donations received by a given charity, but how do they affect what types of charities we support? This article shows intermediary fundraisers can make donors insensitive to differences in charity quality: Unattractive charities can receive the same financial support as an attractive charity. In a series of across‐subject experiments, when donations are framed as going directly to the charity, unattractive charities receive fewer and smaller contributions relative to attractive charities; however, when donations for the same charities are collected by (meaningless) intermediary fundraising campaigns, donations become indistinguishable across charities. The fundraising campaign does not affect donor recall of charity identity or evaluation of charity quality; it simply precludes donors from using these data in the donation decision. Follow‐up experiments suggest the results are driven by information overload.

慈善捐赠行为经济学实验经济学市场营销