DISCRIMINATION IN A MODEL OF CONTESTS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT ABILITY
研究了参赛者能力私有且相同时的竞赛，设计者根据产出质量提供奖励，比较了无歧视和有歧视竞赛的均衡结果与设计者收益，给出了歧视竞赛更优的条件。
We study contests with private information and identical contestants, where contestants' efforts and innate abilities generate output of varying qualities. The designer's revenue depends on the quality of the output, and she offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality. We characterize the equilibrium behavior, outcomes, and payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory (where the reward is contestant‐dependent) contests. We derive conditions under which the designer obtains a larger payoff when using a discriminatory contest and describe settings, where these conditions are satisfied.