Conflicting Selves: Family Owners' Multiple Goals and Self-Control Agency Problems in Private Firms
研究私营企业中家族所有者在经济与非经济目标间的内心冲突如何导致财务资源分配中的自我控制代理问题，发现财务松弛与盈利能力的关系取决于家族所有者目标的凸显性。
This study examines the self–control agency problems associated with family ownership in private firms. Theorizing that family owners’ inner conflicts between economic and non–economic goals lead to competing preferences in the allocation of financial resources, we predict that the relationship between financial slack and firm profitability is contingent on factors that increase the potential salience of either economic or noneconomic goals for family owners. Accordingly, our findings suggest that self–control is a separate source of agency costs in private firms and that family ownership is not as crucial as owners’ goals in predicting the impact of financial slack on firm profitability.