Relaxing CAFE: Foreign direct investment, NAFTA and domestic product standards
研究了美国燃油经济性政策中的“两车队规则”如何成为非关税贸易壁垒，利用北美自由贸易协定实施后该规则的取消，发现受规则约束的车型离岸成本下降更多，价格降低5%至10%。
Abstract This paper studies the effects of domestic product standards on the offshoring behaviour of automotive firms. In particular, we examine an important non‐tariff barrier to trade within US fuel economy policy—the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) “two‐fleet rule.” By leveraging the removal of the two‐fleet rule upon implementation of NAFTA and exploiting a policy discontinuity based on vehicle characteristics, we present evidence that the costs of offshoring were reduced to a larger degree for varieties that were subject to US fuel economy rules. Specifically, we estimate that prices fell between 5% to 10% for varieties subject to the CAFE two‐fleet rule relative to varieties that were exempt from the rule. These effects are persistent, not present for manufacturers that did not offshore prior to NAFTA and are robust to variety‐specific trends. These effects also reconcile the post‐NAFTA differences in implied compliance costs between cars and trucks for our treatment manufacturer (Chrysler). Overall, the results highlight the potential costs of regional enforcement of otherwise location‐neutral product standards, which may act as a barrier to natural patterns of efficient specialization.