Public–Private Mixed Delivery and Information Effects
分析了在价格管制下，公私混合提供基本公共服务的效果，发现只有当私人企业成本不确定性大、公共企业管理激励问题严重且两者绩效高度相关时，混合提供才优于纯公共或纯私人提供。
This paper analyses public–private mixed delivery of essential public services under price regulation. A private firm may have lower production costs and can potentially provide a performance benchmark for a public firm. A public firm may offer higher‐quality service and can reveal the production cost of the private firm to the regulator. However, this paper shows that public–private mixed delivery does not always dominate public delivery or private delivery. Mixed delivery is optimal only when (i) the cost uncertainty of the private firm is large, (ii) the managerial incentive problem of the public firm is large, and (iii) the performances of the public and private firms are highly correlated.