Subgame-Perfect ε-Equilibria in Perfect Information Games with Common Preferences at the Limit
证明了在多玩家完美信息博弈中，若收益函数有界且在极限处具有共同偏好，则对任意ε>0都存在纯子博弈完美ε-均衡；若收益函数值域有限，则存在纯子博弈完美0-均衡。
We prove the existence of a pure subgame–perfect epsilon–equilibrium, for every epsilon > 0, in multiplayer perfect information games, provided that the payoff functions are bounded and exhibit common preferences at the limit. If, in addition, the payoff functions have finite range, then there exists a pure subgame–perfect 0–equilibrium. These results extend and unify recent existence theorems for bounded and semicontinuous payoffs.