The Effect of Marketing Effort on Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Systems
研究了在制造商主导的双渠道闭环供应链中，由制造商或零售商承担营销努力对决策和利润的影响，并提出了一个两部收费契约来协调供应链。
This paper explores a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer is the CLSC Stackelberg leader. We investigate the effect of exerting marketing effort on the optimal decisions and profits of supply chain members by considering several marketing effort supported models, namely the models when the manufacturer is the investor, the retailer is the investor, and the centralized CLSC system, respectively. We propose a two-part tariff contract for coordinating the CLSC. We analytically reveal that the two-part tariff contract can coordinate the CLSC when the manufacturer is the investor but unable to coordinate supply chain when the retailer is the investor. Finally, we present the numerical analysis to uncover insights on how the consumers' preference toward the direct channel affects the optimal decisions in the dual-channel CLSC system.