Preferential Resource Spending under an Employment Guarantee: The Political Economy of MGNREGS in Andhra Pradesh
研究印度国家农村就业保障计划在安得拉邦的支出数据，发现尽管有问责和透明机制，政治倾向对资金分配影响很小，支出主要由受益者需求驱动。
Are ostensibly demand-driven public works programs with high levels of safeguards nonetheless susceptible to politi al influence?We investigate this conjecture using expenditure data at the local level from India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. Focusing on one state where accountability and transparency mechanisms have been employed and implementation efforts have been widely applauded, we find no evidence of partisan-influenced spending before the 2009 election and find that the political leaning of a mandal played only a small part in fund distribution after the 2009 election. Most variation in public works expenditures is explained by the observed needs of potential beneficiaries, as the scheme intended.