Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
研究了一种双边多对一匹配模型，其中每个槽位有自己的优先级顺序，尽管分支的选择函数不满足通常的可替代性条件，但证明了稳定结果存在且可通过累积报价机制找到。
We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by filling its slots sequentially, according to an order of precedence. We demonstrate that in these matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the slot-specific priorities framework and can be found by a cumulative offer mechanism that is strategy-proof and respects unambiguous improvements in priority.