Do Natural Disasters Open a Window of Opportunity for Corruption?
研究了自然灾害与地方政府腐败的关系，发现灾害后官员家庭支出未受显著影响，而非官员家庭支出大幅下降，暗示官员可能获得未观测到的货币补偿即腐败。
This study explores the link between natural disasters and corruption at the local government level. We examine whether a natural disaster affects official households more favourably than non-official households. We find that natural disasters decrease nonofficial household expenditures significantly, however, they have negligible effect on official household expenditures. Meanwhile, both kinds of households experience similar reduction in incomes, and have much the same disaster coping strategies. Together, the results imply that local officials may receive unobserved monetary compensation – we define as corruption – in the aftermath of natural disasters.