Decentralization and efficiency of subsidy targeting: Evidence from chiefs in rural Malawi
研究了马拉维两个大型补贴项目中，传统酋长负责瞄准受益者的分权机制，发现任人唯亲影响有限，但酋长倾向于瞄准农业投入回报高的农户，这比严格按贫困瞄准更具生产效率，且在有再分配的村庄更明显。
Lower-income countries spend vast sums on subsidies. Beneficiaries are typically selected via either a proxy-means test (PMT) or through a decentralized identification process led by local leaders. A decentralized allocation may offer informational advantages, but may be prone to elite capture. We study this trade-off in the context of two large-scale subsidy programs in Malawi (for agricultural inputs and food) decentralized to traditional leaders ("chiefs") who are asked to target the needy. Using household panel data, we find that nepotism exists but has only limited mistargeting consequences. Importantly, we find that chiefs target households with higher returns to farm inputs, generating an allocation that is more productively efficient than what could be achieved through strict poverty-targeting. This could be welfare improving, since within-village redistribution is common. Productive efficiency targeting is concentrated in villages with above-median levels of redistribution.