Doctors without Borders? Relicensing Requirements and Negative Selection in the Market for Physicians
利用移民医生再培训分配规则，发现获得职业许可带来高回报但存在逆向选择，更严格的重新执业要求可能降低医生平均服务质量。
Re-licensing requirements for professionals that move across borders are widespread. In this paper, we measure the effects of occupational licensing by exploiting an immigrant physician re-training assignment rule. Instrumental variables and quantile treatment effects estimates indicate large returns to ac-quiring an occupational license and negative selection into licensing status. We also develop a model of optimal license acquisition which, together with the empirical results, suggests that stricter re-licensing requirements may not only lead to practitioner rents, but also to lower average quality of service in the market for physicians. ∗We are grateful to the editor, Josh Angrist, and two anonymous referees for very useful com-