The Allocation of Future Business: Dynamic Relational Contracts with Multiple Agents
研究了企业如何在多个供应商之间动态分配业务以激励他们，发现最优分配会依赖与收益无关的过往表现来增强激励可信度，并提出了能达到最优的分配规则。
We consider how a firm dynamically allocates business among several suppliers to motivate them in a relational contract. The firm chooses one supplier who exerts private effort. Output is non-contractible, and each supplier observes only his own relationship with the principal. In this setting, allocation decisions constrain the transfers that can be promised to suppliers in equilibrium. Consequently, optimal allocation decisions condition on payoff-irrelevant past performance to make strong incentives credible. We construct a dynamic allocation rule that attains first-best whenever any allocation rule does. This allocation rule performs strictly better than any rule that depends only on payoff-relevant information.