An optimal rule for patent damages under sequential innovation
研究了当后续创新者可能侵犯初始创新者专利时，如何设计最优的损害赔偿规则，发现结合“利润损失”和“不当得利”的线性规则能实现社会福利最大化。
Abstract We analyze the optimal design of damages for patent infringement when a follow‐on innovator may infringe the patent of an initial innovator. We consider damage rules that are linear combinations of the popular “lost profit” (LP) and “unjust enrichment” (UE) rules, coupled with a lump‐sum transfer between innovators. Such linear rules can sometimes induce the socially optimal levels of sequential innovation and the optimal allocation of industry output. The optimal linear rule achieves the highest welfare among all rules that ensure a balanced budget for the industry, and often secures substantially more welfare than either the LP rule or the UE rule.