Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange
提出一种新的双边匹配模型，用于学费交换和工人交换等需要进出口平衡的项目，并设计了双边顶层交易循环机制，该机制平衡高效、对工人策略证明，且鼓励企业充分参与。
We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchanges, in which export-import balances are required for longevity of programs. These exchanges use decentralized markets, making it difficult to achieve this goal. We introduce the two-sided top trading cycles, the unique mechanism that is balanced-efficient, worker-strategy-proof, acceptable, individually rational, and respecting priority bylaws regarding worker eligibility. Moreover, it encourages exchange, because full participation induces a dominant-strategy equilibrium for firms. We extend it to dynamic settings permitting tolerable yearly imbalances and demonstrate that its regular and tolerable versions perform considerably better than models of current practice.