Bailouts, Time Inconsistency, and Optimal Regulation: A Macroeconomic View
提出，即使私人市场有效，政府出于善意且无承诺能力时仍会救助企业以避免破产成本，从而引入无效率；有序清算权、杠杆监管和规模税才能实现可持续有效的结果。
A common view is that bailouts of firms by governments are needed to cure inefficiencies in private markets. We propose an alternative view: even when private markets are efficient, costly bankruptcies will occur and benevolent governments without commitment will bail out firms to avoid bankruptcy costs. Bailouts then introduce inefficiencies where none had existed. Although granting the government orderly resolution powers which allow it to rewrite private contracts improves on bailout outcomes, regulating leverage and taxing size is needed to achieve the relevant constrained efficient outcome, the sustainably efficient outcome. This outcome respects governments' incentives to intervene when they lack commitment.