Contract ineffectiveness in emerging markets: An institutional theory perspective⋆
研究新兴市场中合同无效性的制度成因（信息透明度和法律执行力）及其对企业寻求社会关系（商业和政治关系）的影响，并发现股权压力与效率压力对上述关系的调节作用。基于中国187家分销商数据验证。
Abstract The effectiveness of contracts is bounded by the institutional environment in which they are designed and enforced. When firms form supply chain partnerships in emerging markets, they may experience contract ineffectiveness , which is defined as a firm's perceived limits of contracts with respect to safeguarding interests and coordinating activities. Specifically, we identify two institutional factors that may give rise to contract ineffectiveness, information transparency and legal enforceability, as they determine how effectively a firm designs and enforces a contract. In addition, we reveal that contract ineffectiveness prompts a firm to seek social ties, including business ties and political ties, to overcome the institutionally induced limits of contracts. These efforts, however, are moderated by the type of predominant pressure a firm bears. While equity pressure strengthens the relationship between contract ineffectiveness and a firm's pursuit of social ties, efficiency pressure weakens this relationship, because seeking social ties imposes an extra burden of efficiency. Tested by data collected from 187 distributors in China, our study reveals the institutional causes and the consequences of contract ineffectiveness, which is a common problem encountered by firms when forming supply chain partnerships in emerging markets.