Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games
研究了一类称为可分离动态博弈的模型，证明当周期足够短时，这些模型具有协议不变性，即马尔可夫完美均衡集几乎不依赖于玩家在周期内的行动顺序，这增强了模型的稳健性并便利了应用研究。
We characterize a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separable dynamic games with noisy transitions and establish that these widely used models are protocol invariant provided that periods are sufficiently short. Protocol invariance means that the set of Markov perfect equilibria is nearly the same irrespective of the order in which players are assumed to move within a period. Protocol invariance can facilitate applied work, and renders the implications and predictions of a model more robust. Our class of dynamic stochastic games includes investment games, research and development races, models of industry dynamics, dynamic public contribution games, asynchronously repeated games, and many other models from the extant literature.