欧洲单一监管机制启动的意外后果

The Unintended Consequences of the Launch of the Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · 2017
被引 72
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

研究了欧洲单一监管机制启动后,受直接监管的大型银行比受间接监管的小型银行更大幅度减少贷款,以收缩资产负债表和提高资本充足率。

Abstract

The launch of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) was an historic event. Beginning in Nov. 2014, the most significant banks came under the direct supervision of the European Central Bank (ECB), while national supervisory authorities (NSAs) maintained direct supervision of the remaining banks. Thus, supervision is conducted on two levels, which could cause inconsistency problems. Did the behavior of the significant banks differ from that of the less significant banks during the SSM launch? We find that the significant banks reduced their lending activity more than the less significant banks did in order to shrink their balance sheets and increase their capitalization.

单一监管机制欧洲央行银行监管贷款行为