On the equivalence of large individualized and distributionalized games
研究大规模个体化博弈与分布化博弈之间的关系，通过一个两行动单特征的分布化博弈例子，给出三个等价性结果，并揭示勒贝格单位区间与饱和空间的不同作用。
The theory of large one-shot simultaneous-play games with a biosocial typology has been presented in both the individualized and distributionalized forms-large individualized games (LIG) and large distributionalized games (LDG), respectively. Using an example of an LDG with two actions and a single trait in which some Nash equilibrium distributions cannot be induced by the Nash equilibria of the representing LIG, this paper offers three equivalence results that delineate a relationship between the two game forms. Our analysis also reveals the different roles that the Lebesgue unit interval and a saturated space play in the theory.