Do Firms Engage in Risk-Shifting? Empirical Evidence
实证检验企业是否在财务困境时增加投资风险，结果发现企业反而降低风险，且短期债务和银行债务的约束是抑制风险转移的关键机制。
I empirically test whether firms engage in risk-shifting. Contrary to what risk-shifting theory predicts, I find that firms reduce investment risk when they approach financial distress. To identify the effect of distress on risk-taking, I use a natural experiment with exogenous changes to leverage. Risk reduction is most prevalent among firms that have shorter maturity debt, bank debt, and tighter bank loan financial covenants. These findings suggest that debt composition and financial covenants serve as important mechanisms to mitigate debt-equity agency conflicts, such as risk-shifting, that are not explicitly contracted on. Received January 8, 2015; accepted May 27, 2016 by Editor David Denis.