Sovereign Debt Portfolios, Bond Risks, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy
研究发现，当本币债务能为政府提供更大对冲收益时，政府反而借入更多外币债务。模型引入风险厌恶的贷款人和缺乏货币政策承诺，解释了这一现象。
ABSTRACT We document that governments whose local currency debt provides them with greater hedging benefits actually borrow more in foreign currency. We introduce two features into a government's debt portfolio choice problem to explain this finding: risk‐averse lenders and lack of monetary policy commitment. A government without commitment chooses excessively countercyclical inflation ex post, which leads risk‐averse lenders to require a risk premium ex ante. This makes local currency debt too expensive from the government's perspective and thereby discourages the government from borrowing in its own currency.