Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism
研究了制造商与零售商网络之间的纵向合同安排，当零售商拥有私人信息且组织通过双边合同运行时，制造商操纵从每个关系中获取的信息会产生新的信息机会主义，通过简单的事后激励相容约束刻画了对此类机会主义稳健的分配集。
We consider vertical contracting arrangements between a manufacturer and a retailing network when retailers have private information and the organization is run through bilateral contracts. We highlight a new form of informational opportunism arising when the manufacturer manipulates information learned separately in each relationship. We characterize the set of allocations robust to such opportunism by means of simple ex post incentive compatibility constraints. Those constraints limit the manufacturer's ability to use yardstick competition among retailers. They simplify contracts and restore a rent/efficiency trade-off even with correlated information. We show that sell-out contracts are optimal under a wide range of circumstances.