The Consequences of Increasing the Scope of Managerial Judgement in Accounting Standards
利用中国独特制度背景，采用双重差分法研究发现会计准则扩大管理层判断范围后，应计盈余管理增加、真实盈余管理减少，会计信息相关性提升，但短期市场反应负面且长期股价崩盘风险上升，非国有企业影响更显著。
This paper investigates the consequences of increasing the scope of managerial judgement (ISMJ) in accounting standards via a difference‐in‐differences approach in the unique setting of China. A substantial increase in accruals‐based earnings management is found after ISMJ, in addition to a decline in real activities‐based earnings management resulting from temporarily increased sales, boosted inventory, and expense deferrals. In contrast, we find a significant increase in the relevance of accounting information. Further analysis reveals significant negative cumulative abnormal returns related to the announcement of accounting standards change over the short term. We also find a larger long‐term increase in the crash risk of the stock prices of firms that engage in more accruals‐based earnings management after ISMJ. All of these effects are more pronounced in non‐state‐owned enterprises than in state‐owned enterprises.