Inferring Remediation and Operational Risk from Material Weakness Disclosures
通过实验发现，非专业投资者从实体层面重大缺陷中不仅感知到更高的财务报告风险，还推断出更高的补救和运营风险，这两类风险完全中介并额外解释了缺陷类型与风险评估的关系。
ABSTRACT Understanding the inferences that nonprofessional investors draw from material weakness disclosures is important because of their effect on investment decisions and for assessing whether current standards serve their needs. Prior research shows that users assess higher financial reporting risk for an entity-level material weakness compared to an account-specific material weakness because they perceive the former as presenting a higher risk of potential misstatement. We extend the literature by proposing two variables (remediation and operational risks) that mediate and incrementally explain the observed relationship between the type of material weakness and financial reporting risk assessments. In an experiment involving 181 nonprofessional investors, we find, as predicted, that the entity-level material weakness signals not just a higher potential for undetected misstatements but also higher remediation and operational risks. Further, we find that the two variables fully mediate and incrementally explain the relationship between the type of material weakness and financial reporting risk assessments. To the extent that these variables are decision relevant, our findings suggest that regulators should reconsider and possibly reengineer the current disclosure regime that allows management to disclose unaudited information about these variables. Data Availability: Contact the authors.