Second-Degree Price Discrimination by a Two-Sided Monopoly Platform
研究了双边垄断平台如何通过二级价格歧视来定价，发现价值创造方的激励约束可能与价值捕获方的外部性内化冲突，导致混合定价最优；即使无冲突，边际用户与平均用户偏好差异也可能使混合定价最优。福利分析表明，当双边冲突强烈时，禁止价格歧视可提高福利。
We study second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform. The incentive constraints of the agents on the value creation side may be in conflict with internalizing externalities on the value capture side, which may render pooling optimal. Even without such conflict between the two sides, pooling may be optimal due to type-dependent Spence effects when the preferences of the marginal agents diverge from those of the average agents on the value capture side. We perform a welfare analysis of price discrimination and show that prohibiting price discrimination improves welfare when there is a strong conflict between the two sides.