Recasting the Iron Rice Bowl: The Reform of China's State-Owned Enterprises
研究发现1990年代中期改革后国企盈利能力提升，但重组有限，原因包括政治压力减轻、资本成本下降及资本劳动替代弹性大于1，且生产率仍落后于外资和私营企业。
Following the enactment of reforms in the mid-1990s, China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) became more profitable. Using theoretical insights from Azmat, Manning, and Van Reenen (2012) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and econometric methods in De Loecker andWarzynski (2012), this paper finds that SOE restructuring was nevertheless limited. This is because SOE profitability gains in part reflect that they were under less political pressure to hire excess labor and also their cost of capital fell and their capital-labor elasticity of substitution generally exceeded unity. Moreover, SOE productivity lagged that of foreign and private firms.