竞业限制条款如何扼杀员工绩效

How noncompetes stifle performance

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW · 2014
被引 6
人大 AFT50ABS 3

中文导读

研究发现,被迫签署竞业限制条款的员工积极性显著降低,绩效下滑,反而给公司带来更大成本,而非阻止他们跳槽所能节省的。

Abstract

The authors offer opinions on noncompete clauses in employment contracts. They cite their own research in support of the contention that employees who are forced to sign noncompete clauses in their contracts are much less motivated, and hence do not perform as well, costing their companies more than had they been allowed to leave for another employer

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