Vertical intra-institutional effects of ministerial turnover in the Council of the European Union
研究了欧盟理事会中部长高更替率如何影响部长与官僚的权力平衡，发现高更替率会削弱部长的控制力，为理解欧盟问责制提供新视角。
How do high levels of ministerial turnover affect the strength of ministers and bureaucrats in the Council of the European Union? We test two rival hypotheses – one suggesting that high turnover rates will empower bureaucrats, the other suggesting that they will increase uncertainty and increase ministerial involvement. We empirically document high turnover among ministers in the Council. Next, we develop a conceptual framework that identifies four ways that turnover might affect institutional balances. Then we outline rival hypotheses about turnover’s vertical intra-institutional effects and present statistical models that gauge turnover’s effects on the power of ministers and bureaucrats. Our analysis supports the hypothesis that higher turnover is associated with lower levels of ministerial control. The article generates new insights into institutional dynamics and informs debates about the nature of European Union accountability.