Equitable representation in councils: theory and an application to the United Nations Security Council
研究了理事会投票博弈中的民主公平性，构建理论框架评估国家与地区层面的代表权，并应用于联合国安理会，发现常任理事国代表权过度，非洲代表权不足。
We analyze democratic equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a \nvoting body containing all members delegates decision-making to a (time-varying) subset \nof its members, as describes, e.g., the relationship between the United Nations General \nAssembly and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). We develop a theoretical \nframework for analyzing democratic equitability in CVGs at both the country and region \nlevels, and for different assumptions regarding preference correlation. We apply the \nframework to evaluate the equitability of the UNSC, and the claims of those who seek to \nreform it. We find that the individual permanent members are overrepresented by between \n21.3 times (United Kingdom) and 3.8 times (China) from a country-level perspective, \nwhile from a region perspective Eastern Europe is the most heavily overrepresented region \nwith more than twice its equitable representation, and Africa the most heavily underrepresented. \nOur equity measures do not preclude some UNSC members from exercising veto \nrights, however.