Bank Recapitalization, Regulatory Intervention, and Repayment
利用1994-2010年德国所有银行的审慎监管数据，研究发现监管干预能显著提高受救助银行偿还资本支持的概率，其中强有力的干预措施（如重组令）效果明显，而弱措施反而降低还款概率。
We use prudential supervisory data for all German banks during 1994–2010 to test if regulatory interventions affect the likelihood that bailed‐out banks repay capital support. Accounting for the selection bias inherent in nonrandom bank bailouts by insurance schemes and the endogenous administration of regulatory interventions, we show that regulators can increase the likelihood of repayment substantially. An increase in intervention frequencies by one standard deviation increases the annual probability of capital support repayment by 7%. Sturdy interventions, like restructuring orders, are effective, whereas weak measures reduce repayment probabilities. Intervention effects last up to 5 years.