The effects of wrongful discharge protection on foreign multinationals: Evidence from transaction‐level data
利用1977-1994年美国各州就业保护法实施数据，发现该法增加了外国跨国公司FDI交易的数量和价值下降，尤其在劳动密集型行业影响更大，并存在邻州溢出效应。
Abstract Using detailed micro‐level data from 1977 to 1994, we analyze the impact of employment protection measures adopted across US states on the number and the value of new inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) transactions completed by foreign‐owned companies. Our findings point to a robust negative association between the implementation of employment protection laws and both the extensive and the intensive margins of FDI in the US. When states adopt regulations that increase employers’ firing costs, FDI transactions by foreign multinational companies become less frequent and decrease in value, with stronger negative impacts in more labour‐intensive industries. There is also some evidence of diversion and spillover effects from the adoption of these measures by neighbouring states.