Partner-Scale Economies, Service Bundling, and Auditor Independence in the Australian Self-Managed Superannuation (Pension) Fund Industry
利用澳大利亚税务局数据，研究了自管养老金审计中合伙人规模对审计定价的影响，发现合伙人通过折扣审计费吸引客户，再通过捆绑高利润非审计服务获利，但未发现非审计服务损害审计独立性。
SUMMARY Using proprietary Australian Taxation Office (ATO) data, this study examines audit pricing, service bundling, and independence issues in the self-managed superannuation fund (SMSF) sector, the fastest growing and largest segment of the Australian $2 trillion retirement savings industry. We consider the impact of partner-level scale effects for a large sample of SMSF audits for the three years to June 2010. After controlling for factors known to determine audit fees, we find evidence of fee discounting by partners with large client portfolios. However, when the dependent variable is redefined to the total “bundle” of services (including audit and non-audit fees), the firms of partners with larger client portfolios are shown to earn bundling fee premiums. This finding suggests industry specialists price strategically using audits as a conduit to supply higher margin non-audit services (NAS) to clients with more resources. Last, we find no evidence the supply of NAS impairs auditor independence, alleviating joint supply concerns raised in the Cooper Review.